World on Edge: A Geostrategic Walk-About With Dr. Kenneth Weinstein of the Hudson Institute

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[00:00:19] We voice our concerns back.

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[00:00:37] Dr. Ike Wilson: So Travelers, welcome to the Civic Brief and to this special global geopolitical walkabout and talk about Now, today we're gonna try something a little different. We're gonna somewhat step off the traditional geopolitical maps. We're not gonna depart from them altogether. We we're gonna step. A little bit un traditionally off those traditional map lines and into what we'll [00:01:00] call fault line in the fault line, confrontation zones of a compounding, compounding world from Beijing's bid to we redraw the rules of multipolarity to the re industrializing democracies of what is increasingly becoming what we can call the compute crescent, uh, to the civic and cultural trenches inside our, even our own republic.

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[00:01:47] He's also a longtime advisor on transatlantic strategy, Japan, US Relations, and the defense of liberal democracy and an age of resurgent authoritarianism, a scholar of political philosophy by training and a [00:02:00] practitioner of public diplomacy by experience. Ken has been a steady hand in helping policymakers translate values into viable strategy from the Indo-Pacific to the Atlantic corridor and back again.

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[00:02:37] Uh, Dr. Weinstein. Ken, welcome to the Civic Brief. Wonderful to have you with us today.

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[00:02:48] Dr. Ike Wilson: Outstanding. What I thought we'd do, Ken, um, and we're gonna try to think about this metaphorically. Consider us, I'm an old pilot back in the day, so we're gonna start at about 60,000 feet.

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[00:02:59] Dr. Ike Wilson: And we're gonna go [00:03:00] around the globe and we're gonna take a broad perspective, and then we'll come down in three steps at altitude wise, if you will, and spend eventually some deep dive times in some of the more conflicted and compounding areas of the global map. None better than you can to, uh, to take this flight with me.

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[00:03:59] How, how [00:04:00] has it changed? How is it changing? And to what consequence and kind of in a clin Eastwood kind of way for, for good, for, for bad and for for ugly, you know, what are the consequences of all that? Um, I'll, I'll turn the mic over to you, Ken, and then we'll, uh, we'll start our walk and talk about from there.

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[00:04:40] He had a, uh, photographic memory, new details of Roman history, early modern history was a, uh, he really was a polymath. He was someone who was, uh, trained in both math and physics and in grand strategy. And he was someone who, uh, as he, um, he joined the [00:05:00] Rand Corporation, quit graduate school at, uh, Caltech, and was originally gonna go head into the field of, uh, real estate development.

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[00:05:24] And Herman spent the day at Rand, decided he wanted to join Rand. And he, he was there at Rand from the late 1940s until 1960 or so at the time when Rand was really arguably the most influential American think tank at a point when the Air Force air power, uh, really came to dominate American Grand Strategy with the rise of, uh, both the Soviets and the Chinese as, um, nuclear armed powers and, and meeting the deterrence challenge, uh, uh, that was required at the time.

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[00:06:25] As well as, uh, economic innovation. And one of Herman's Herman founded the Hudson Institute in 1961 to be an organization that would do work on both the defense and economic side using scenario planning. Herman's idea was if you get the big picture right over the long term, the smaller picture will fall into place.

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[00:07:05] And the study he argued, sure, Japan could build a nuclear weapon relatively quickly if it needed to, if it chose to. But the most important thing, thing that came outta the study was the, was the focus on, on both the economics and innovation in Japan and. And this was sort

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[00:07:24] Um, Ken, but correct if I'm wrong. This was, what you're explaining here was at least a good 20 years prior to the fall of the Great powers, you know, by Paul Kennedy.

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[00:07:45] Uh, there was even in the Japanese standard high school textbook, a line about Hudson Institute and Herman Kahn predicting Japan's economic rise that gave great strengths to the Japanese as they, they arose to become this major industrial and innovative [00:08:00] power. Uh, 'cause they saw that others believed in them.

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[00:08:19] Was dismissing the Japanese Prime Minister Ida as a transistor salesman. And, and this, this gets back to our broader theme, which is, I mean, Herman understood how technology innovation, demography all interlinked in the new world of Geostrategy. So he founded Hudson in 1961. I joined Hudson and graduates when I was finishing up my PhD in 1991.

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[00:09:03] And, and part of it is this is the democratization in some ways, if you will, of of foreign and defense policy. We see the rise of, uh. Of both, uh, asymmetric, uh, warfare as, as, as, as quite effective. We're seeing it now in Russia, Ukraine, where you see the Ukrainians building up, uh, drone forces that they're often building right next to the battlefield and have given them, uh, at times an advantage over the Russians who were widely considered, uh, the world's third largest army, maybe second most technologically advanced army.

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[00:10:11] Oftentimes against a state subsidized economic model that has significant advantages over the free market and this kind of competition. And so it's a, uh, challenging moment in which, uh, at times the American deterrent has withered. We were unable to stop the, uh, the Russians from going into, uh, Ukraine in either 2014 or uh, 2022.

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[00:10:48] Dr. Ike Wilson: Sure was.

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[00:11:01] He doesn't think strategically. He hasn't read books of grant strategy. He's an instinctive leader. But I think he fundamentally understands deterrence. It's something I think that comes out of, uh, his, uh, real estate activities, his activities in the business world. He knows when to step away from the table, and we have, you know, we have seen the president, uh, in the second term, we've seen him, uh, bomb the bomb, the Iranian nuclear program, the incredible attack, uh, on June 24th, 20, uh, 25, which I think no one at the beginning of, uh, the Trump administration would've expected.

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[00:12:04] Uh, he certainly talked about the need for rebalancing the global system so that more of America's allies pick up the burden. Uh, and, and that's certainly been the case. We've seen now with, uh, the NATO alliance, for example, the Hague Summit, in which, uh, the NATO allies agree to spend 5% of GDP on defense by 20 35, 3 0.5% for hard defense, 1.5% for infrastructure and the like.

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[00:12:59] So it's [00:13:00] been a. It, it's a time of immense change, immense challenges, geo strategically immense challenges on the leadership side in the sense that we've had changing leaders. And in the United States we've had a very different focus from the Trump administration than either from Trump, won from Obama, Trump, two from Biden.

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[00:13:44] So it's been, it's been an, an, it's been an extraordinary time, uh, to watch. Uh, geopolitics. Hard to analyze. Hard to read the tea leaves, as it were.

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[00:14:10] And you have done just a fantastic job of really taking us from that 60,000 foot, uh, level and taking us around the globe and, and really touched on all the themes, frankly, everything that I was hoping we were gonna get to today. Um, let's, let's dive in a bit. We're gonna come down a, a, a bit in altitude.

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[00:14:44] But, you know, maybe three quick questions on this just to kind of add some texture. And then we're gonna get, we're gonna go down some levels and get into the terrain a bit this year, 2025. And looking forward, uh, you talked a lot about force and power, I would say, particularly in terms of, of [00:15:00] our president and our, our foreign policy under the Trump two administration.

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[00:15:23] Are there different commanding heights, equities, and key nodes that, um, perhaps maybe the, the previous traditional models of analyzing geopolitics, geoeconomics, societal affairs, geostrategy writ large, or may, or maybe just not picking up on those indicators. Have the, have the commanding heights changed at all?

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[00:15:53] Ken Weinstein: Um, the eve of the, uh, the AI era. Yeah. The big data, the big data era. We've got big [00:16:00] data played a, a big role obviously in the first Gulf War. It, it played a role in the second Gulf War.

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[00:16:33] And this is one of these partly democratizing factors where I think over time, with the spread of small modular reactors. Increasing reliance on, uh, LNG, that there'll be an ability to power up data centers around the globe in ways that we currently cannot imagine as we move into the next decade, where I think you will have nations increasingly having, uh, almost a 360 [00:17:00] data awareness of what's going on in their own area.

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[00:17:03] Ken Weinstein: Now there's some countries like the Chinese, who use this data awareness to spy on their own citizens, and we'll see increasingly that occurring in, in authoritarian countries as well, uh, that, uh, choose to act this way. But, um, and, and that sort of, you know, and, and the question is, will the United States win the AI and quantum war against China or not?

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[00:17:48] Uh, we're not producing enough people in the hard sciences as of yet who can help us really to kind of lock this thing up. That being that

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[00:18:10] And it seems that, to your point, geez, China is well ahead of us in that respect. Um, by all indications, um, probably gonna keep the lead. That, that's one of my main concerns. I think we've got, I think we've, I think we still have a corner on the market on the commanding height of the centers themselves.

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[00:18:54] Uh, I'm, I'm glad you emphasized that.

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[00:19:26] It's gonna make things harder on us moving forward. At the same time, look, the Europeans have, are regulating themselves to death in the AI space. They really can't be, uh, partners to us. Uh, Japan is dealing with demographic changes, as is Korea. They're both dealing with massive demographic changes moving forward.

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[00:19:46] Ken Weinstein: Uh, shrinking populations. The Japanese lost almost a million people this year, which is out of 121 million people. That's a, that's a huge percentage of the population, and there's no reason to think the numbers are gonna be reversed anytime soon. So you, so you've got this, you've got [00:20:00] the big data challenge, you've got the demographic challenge, the technological challenge, the willpower challenge, and I think partly in the United States too, that, that I think the Chinese think of themselves as, uh, promoting their national good and they have a little bit of the spartan in them that they're willing to sacrifice for the national good.

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[00:20:48] So, you know, I, I, I think about that in a, in a big picture way as certainly the main challenge we face. 'cause that's gonna determine the future of warfare as, as we [00:21:00] discussed, uh, which is increasingly autonomous, uh, though, you know, with manned partners, right? But, uh, and so, uh, it's, it's, you know, and, and the ability to think big, to think creatively, strategically, to think outside the box, uh, while.

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[00:21:36] Mm-hmm. I'm somewhat more optimistic. I just look, you look at what, uh, the President did in, uh, in Gaza, that what the Trump administration did, the agreement, the peace agreement, uh, that was reached whereby the, uh, by Hamas released the 20 living Israeli prisoners. They're starting to release the bodies of the Israelis, uh, killed, uh, either on October 7th or thereafter.

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[00:22:43] We've seen Israel def and its seventh front war against, against Hamas, against Hezbollah, uh, against, uh, Iran against, uh, Iranian proxies in, uh, against the Houthis against Iranian proxies in, uh, in, uh, Iraq, et cetera. The West [00:23:00] Bank, I think it's Israel has been immensely successful, and in turn, the United States is power in the Middle East is now, uh, at a remarkable high, and, and there'll be, there'll be massive challenges in rebuilding Gaza and in Deradicalizing.

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[00:23:42] Narrator: Yeah.

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[00:24:11] And, and the possibility now looking at the situation in, uh, in Latin America as well, which could, you know, be a really renewed American and power that we'll see. It could backfire, but, uh, we'll have to see in the coming weeks and months that on top of, I think, a re reinvigorated NATO alliance that, uh, you know, there was all sorts of speculation when President Trump, uh, came back to office that, uh, the NATO alliance was in severe difficulty that Trump might even pull forces out of NATO or pull the US out of nato, which was, uh, you know, just ridiculous hypothesizing in the end we saw the well,

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[00:24:48] I mean, he, he did, he did make certain statements and signals that he, he did have that on the table. I think, I think hindsight being better in 2020, I think we could, we should give the president credit [00:25:00] for, for, for not taking anything off the table, including walking away from, uh, an alignment, an alliance that is proving.

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[00:25:19] Ken Weinstein: And I think that's, and I think that's part of Trump's mo. Donald Trump acts like a restrainer in world affairs. He acts like someone who doesn't wanna be engaged internationally.

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[00:25:48] Yeah. And the tone on Ukraine shifted. And I think he's similarly doing the same thing in the Indo-Pacific where he is, he has been critical of the Taiwanese. He will never say what, uh, president Biden said [00:26:00] four times that we're obligated to defend Taiwan by a treaty in case of a Chinese attack. And Trump does that, I think intentionally.

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[00:26:49] And so they, they will take some of these tr, president Trump tends to think out loud when he is doing strategy and doing policy, which is very different than our past presidents often, [00:27:00] who often made very cautious remarks before saying anything. Whereas the president's willing to just throw ideas on the table, whether it be Mara Gaza, you know, whether it be, well, you know, the Japanese and the, uh, south Koreans should develop nuclear weapons as he suggested in the, uh, the campaign in 2016.

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[00:27:26] Dr. Ike Wilson: There are three things that come out of this phenomenal articulation. You've we're, we're off path, off glide slope. Now to stick with the flying metaphor, Ken, as I hope we would be, we talked about it.

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[00:27:38] Ken Weinstein: Yeah.

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[00:27:55] Kind of approach to a trump, let's call it a grand strategy, if you will, [00:28:00] doesn't, you know, grand strategy doesn't have to be something that Yeah. Is bis marky and laid out in, in script and verse on a, on a document. It can just be the way you actually conduct business and the logic behind it is there, is there a create, you're, I think I'm hearing you say there is a creativity that we really don't understand quite enough behind, behind the creative destruction of, of foreign policy under this administration.

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[00:28:43] 'cause they're busy focused on the system, on its rules, on what's going on. They don't step back and see why that the system is so dysfunctional, I think. And just as he entered the world of Manhattan real estate and saw there was this. Place for ultra high end real estate around Trump Tower. Uh, I think he [00:29:00] views and, and saw and sees himself as a transformative figure.

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[00:29:22] And instead his view is first to demand reciprocity of our allies and partners, and then to bring greater focus to what the real strategic challenges are. And the president, he would, because he's not a strategist, he wouldn't articulate things in that manner, just as he would never say, I act like a restrainer.

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[00:30:00] And now he's trying to bring them back to focus on national security. And I think the same in the Indo-Pacific. He wants the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Filipinos, Philippines. He wants, uh, Taiwan and increasingly Indonesia really to focus on. Its hard, their hard security needs, uh, and to be prepared for the potential of a China contingency.

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[00:30:45] Yeah. Uh, we see Korea getting more serious about its own national security, talking about building a, some version of the Iron Dome, uh, to face the, uh, the North Korea challenge. You see the Philippines, uh, which wavered between the US and, and [00:31:00] China under Duterte, uh, under Marcos firmly in the US camp. And you see the Indonesians doing more with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, in particular the Japanese.

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[00:31:32] I think they we're gonna see more and more of the Ukrainian defense supply chain linked to the German defense supply chain. I think this is, you know, and its German, German moves more of its manufacturing out of the auto sector, which is weakened. Because of the rise of China as an automotive manufacturer, which the Germans themselves arguably contributed to, uh, you're gonna see the rise of an incredible high tech, uh, German defense industry.

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[00:32:12] And so they're, you know, the Japanese just won this bid to supply, uh, uh, Mo Montgomery class frigates to, uh, to Australia. There are other nations that are interested in Montgomery costs. Frigates. Uh, you know, we're, we're sort of at a moment where countries that have been out of the defense business are now getting back into it on both the hard defense side, on the dual use side.

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[00:33:02] We're seeing grow, grow, grow deepening ties with the Australians, with, with the, with the Philippines. And so it, it's an exciting moment. We see the Brits also stepping up with the Japanese and with other US allies, uh, with the Koreans and, and the like. So we're, I think we're at a moment of a strategic turn, and I think the President deserves credit for bringing the strategic turn about, in part because he has, uh, and I believe it's intentional sown doubt about the, uh, future of the US deterrent, which, and I think it's, I think it's intentional.

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[00:33:45] Dr. Ike Wilson: I think you've given a great, you've probably given the answer to the question I want to ask to kind of bring us back, um, to help our listeners, our fellow travelers, get a better understanding of what often is articulated by the administration of peace [00:34:00] through, through strength.

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[00:34:02] Dr. Ike Wilson: Right. You've given a great expression of, that may maybe a little bit more on is this, is this what peace through strength looks like and you, and a bit more on the articulation of how this administration is defining strength?

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[00:34:21] Right. That was emblematic of the Reagan administration.

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[00:34:24] Ken Weinstein: Uh, I think in those years there was less of a capacity to engage in the sort of tactics that President Trump engages in. That put pressure on our allies and partners. We really, there could not be an inch between us and our allies when we were facing the Soviets because of both the, the Soviet, uh, weapons challenge, but also the public opinion challenge.

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[00:35:15] We saw it under Trump 1.0 when he had Xi Jinping president at, uh, Mar-a-Lago for a dinner, and the president announced during the dessert course that the United States was striking at, uh, uh, targets in Syria because, uh. Yeah. Uh, president Asana had used chemical weapons, and I think it is that kind of use of, uh, a piece short of show of deterrent that really matters to Donald Trump.

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[00:35:58] And the [00:36:00] bomber had never been used. I remember, I, I am, I am 64 when I was, I was in high school in the late seventies, and we were talking about the B two bomber and building it.

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[00:36:11] Ken Weinstein: And, you know, we're finally, you know, 40 odd years later, we're finally using it. And so I think that's kind of, and I think that's the president's understanding of things, that he, he wants to use his toys as he if he can, and that also bolsters the deterrent.

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[00:36:43] And he, and he understands that he, but he, but to him, force is not the first resort. It's, it's a kind of last resort in some ways. And, you know, we're now seeing him threaten, uh, to use force, uh, to stop, uh, the attacks on Christians [00:37:00] in Nigeria. I think that he'll actually get to the point where wanna use force in this case, but I think he's trying to send a signal to say, I will use force.

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[00:37:29] Uh, Biden was president, uh, Obama was, and more willing to use power, I think, than Bush was. For less than altruistic reasons, Bush was willing to go to Iraq because he thought he was building democracy in Iraq. In addition to getting rid of programs of weapons, of mass destruction, uh, I think Trump is more willing to, to, to go to war to pursue national interest.

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[00:38:18] A comp a comp, a credible, compelling threat.

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[00:38:22] Dr. Ike Wilson: That is the undercarriage. And I think you've given a great articulation, a very sound logical articulation of, of the use of force. Not to just, not to just play with the toys, if you will.

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[00:38:35] Dr. Ike Wilson: But as a, as a logical, rational building of a baseline of credible, compelling force so that you can do the, you know, the TR Roosevelt thing, walks awfully, not just carry a big stick and be able to walk softly because you carry a big stick.

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[00:38:59] Ken Weinstein: Oh, absolutely. [00:39:00] Yeah. Yeah. And Trump's, Trump's issue is, he doesn't like to walk softly. Right. I, and so, but when he does, like when he decided to bomb the Iranian nuclear program and then he said he, he'd make up his mind in the next two weeks.

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[00:39:29] We wrapped in the one, the president's like, okay guys, I gotta go now I got a more important problem. I don't think he wanted the, his big achievement at the NATO summit to be overshadowed. So, yeah, it's funny 'cause I think it's a mix of this sort of, yeah, definitely. You know, when the stick needs to be used, it needs to be used, certainly.

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[00:39:53] Dr. Ike Wilson: what do you think his and the administration's, um, vision and articulation of the piece to be made looks like? [00:40:00] And is it different? Is it, is there anything unique about it under, uh, uh, Trump America first, um, uh, moment versus the moments of, of the past, even the most recent past

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[00:40:10] I, I do look, first you look, I mean the, look, the president as like any political leader, he is managing a broad coalition and they, the broad coalition runs from people who are restrainers, who really feel the United States has nothing to do with Ukraine, shouldn't be engaged, uh, in getting rid of the Iranian nuclear program.

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[00:40:37] Dr. Ike Wilson: Yeah.

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[00:40:49] Politically, but I think they're more influential in the administration than they are nationally.

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[00:40:54] Ken Weinstein: Uh, then there is a broader set of people who are, you know, Jacksonian [00:41:00] Democrats as my Hudson is who colleague Walter Russell, me Believe you bet. Talks about these are people who believe, you know, they don't want the US to be engaged internationally, but when something happens that angers us so much, we have to respond, then we act quickly.

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[00:41:37] Some of it is more strategic. So the, for example, Cambodia, Thailand. Okay. That was signing that peace agreement at the Ian Summit. Was an important moment because it showed the president valued Ian. There were some doubts about the president's commitments to Southeast Asia, right? There were some views that his, there were some arguments that his, his views on trade had really alienated the region [00:42:00] and the fact that he went to the Ian Summit, uh, which his, which Joe Biden had missed, which Trump had missed in the first term.

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[00:42:43] Has raised at its, uh, borders and, you know, and it also allows the president to return to his dream, which is, uh, focusing on the Abraham Accords, expanding the Abraham Accords beyond the UAE Morocco and Bahrain to potentially Saudi Arabia and even [00:43:00] Qatar. So that's more of a strategic focus. I look, I look at Ukraine.

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[00:43:23] And on Ukraine, he has gone back and forth. He didn't think the Ukrainians had a path to victory then he thought they did, then he thought they didn't. But what his most recent articulation of, uh, what he sees in Ukraine, I think very much fits how I, under what I think to be Trump's mo strategically, which is.

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[00:44:01] But then he came in to understand that he could try to entice them with the prospect of economic development. Uh, in order to get them to ize, both approaches failed. But he kind of brought the two of them together in his summits with Kim Jong-Un with regard to Iran. It was, uh, maximum pressure in the first term, but the idea was the new trade deal that would get, I'm sorry, a new deal with Iran that would get her to the nuclear program, the missile program.

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[00:44:45] His most recent formulation on Ukraine has been, uh, telling the Ukrainians, you're gonna have to give up territory, but in return you're gonna get security guarantees of the kind that you never imagined you would get. Yeah. Now, these security guarantees would be primarily offered by our [00:45:00] European allies.

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[00:45:23] Putin would not emerge. Victor victorious. He's still, he's barely gained any territory. Correct. In, in, you know, in the last few years and he is done so at a massive cost of lives in his own country. So, you know, that's where I see things going there.

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[00:45:50] Ken Weinstein: Yeah.

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[00:46:01] Ken Weinstein: well, I think Putin's bet is that we in the west are gonna turn our attention waves. We've seen this before, you know, where, where all of a sudden we get focused on, uh, uh, you know, it's, it's a strategic distraction.

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[00:46:31] It is, you know, I think the president and the administration's been back and forth on this, but I, I believe the president wants the Europeans to form some kind of a security force that could man the border between Russia and Ukraine. Mm-hmm. And with the potential air support from the United States. So that goes back and forth in sort of internal administration debates.

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[00:47:11] That's not where the president is, and I think the president doesn't like to be, doesn't wanna look like a fool in these kinds of negotiations. So I think we'll have to see where things end up. I mean, I don't. Think we're particularly close to a European security force being yet in place.

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[00:47:27] Ken Weinstein: Uh, and I still think it's quite possible the president could snap on Putin and, you know, he is taken now the point of, uh, putting sanctions on, on Luke Oil, it, it's quite, uh, uh, remarkable.

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[00:47:57] Dr. Ike Wilson: You had talked, uh, we had, you had, you had [00:48:00] taken us into the train of Western Hemisphere, particularly Southern Cone Venezuela, more, more pointedly. Uh, you mentioned, you mentioned something about the Maduro regime that I've not heard articulated, um, across any mainstream media and you had really have to hunt for it, um, across social media to find it.

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[00:48:44] Could you maybe articulate, you know, put, put some more meat on the bones there because I, that you, you just, in that articulation, you enlarged the context of it. It opens ground for us to reconsider and hunt for and maybe find a logic, uh, in the focus on, [00:49:00] um, Maduro himself right now by, by, uh, our country, by the administration.

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[00:49:25] Yeah. And obviously their ties to Iran as well. Um, you know, that were critical and that allowed, and it was partly, it's sort of a means of asymmetric warfare in some ways, to, at low cost to bolster a real irritant, uh, for the United States and to use that irritant to ship, uh, drugs, ship fentanyl and other things into the United States at low cost.

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[00:50:27] And that, that will strengthen America's hand in Latin America, will strengthen our fight against illegal drugs. Uh, certainly. And I think that there's a way in which our adversaries, the Chinese obviously are a major source of fentanyl into the United States. It's one of the reasons why the president, uh, chose the tariff policy he did as a means to sort of put massive pressure on China to get it to stop, uh, uh, providing, uh, you know, stop shipping fentanyl into the United States.

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[00:51:05] Dr. Ike Wilson: But in this respect, a very strategic use of tariff.

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[00:51:10] Dr. Ike Wilson: As an instrument, a very strategic point of targeted use that, um, is different than just kind of the, the broad area

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[00:51:17] Dr. Ike Wilson: Performing approach of tariffs across the board.

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[00:51:25] Dr. Ike Wilson: Yeah. You

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[00:51:29] Dr. Ike Wilson: Right.

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[00:51:39] And, uh, you know, we have every reason to think that the fentanyl getting into the United States, a lot of it's being directed by the Chinese that they're openly involved in, in, in, in, in making sure it's out there.

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[00:52:03] The Madira regime, making the case of the connections, not, not just the, the acute connections, but a chronic connection with Jesus, China, um, and, uh, Putin's Russia and the Iranians.

[: 00:52:15

[00:52:34] And so they're, they tend to be less strategic in, in their communications. They don't find that, especially a credible way to communicate.

[: 00:52:40

[00:52:56] It seems like on this point alone is where, [00:53:00] um, we lose the grandness of the strategy. In the sense of a grandness of the strategy right. To our own public and their lies legitimacy, right. Trust and legitimacy. What thoughts on that?

[: 00:53:12

[00:53:21] That we, people like UME sit across the table from people, from our allies and partners, and were willing to make them happy. Forgetting about the needs of average, Americans are paying the tab for all these things. And in this sense, he, by focusing on the interest of average Americans and what our foreign policy was doing, what our trade policy was doing, he really helped democratize foreign policy in some ways.

[: 00:53:43

[00:53:52] Dr. Ike Wilson: Yeah. Okay, great. I do want to ask one more question and maybe a quick lightning round. Um, sure. The, the question I want to ask, [00:54:00] is it really. Lives within the Western Hemisphere in the vis, in the Venezuela, uh, problem set more broadly, frankly, this, this whole, uh, approach to narco terrorism and the, the strikes against the, um, the alleged, uh, drug boats.

[: 00:54:17

[00:54:36] His, his, uh, fulfillment of, of the articulation during the first term. The questions of legality and transparency of the, of the strikes going on against the, the alleged, um, narco terrorism, um, fishing boats, really, you know, butting up against established. Domestic, US domestic law, international law and humanitarian [00:55:00] law, and, and codified norms.

[: 00:55:02

[00:55:09] Ken Weinstein: Yeah,

[: 00:55:09

[00:55:22] Do, as I say, not as I do in terms of establish being the keeper, as the, as the superpower and the hegemon, if you will, the global leading power. Establishing a lot of these rules, domestic and international rules and norms. Seems, seems the tactical wins could come at a, uh, theater, strategic and even more grand strategic major cost.

[: 00:55:43

[00:55:59] Ken Weinstein: yeah. No, [00:56:00] look, look, I, I think the president's view on this is that international law serves as a deterrent to the United States taking action.

[: 00:56:07

[00:56:07] Ken Weinstein: That international law is promoted by, uh, nations that are not, uh, the United States. That it is ignored by our enemies. You know, when, when China's sending fentanyl in the United is complaining about international law, you know, when, uh, the, uh, when Venezuela is sending narcotics and who's complaining about international law and that international law is only complained about by those who seek to weaken us.

[: 00:56:33

[00:57:04] Dr. Ike Wilson: Let, lemme

[: 00:57:05

[00:57:07] Dr. Ike Wilson: I appreciate that, Ken. I just, let me, you know, what immediately comes to my mind is, you know, I'll, the geek in me comes out. Right? Yeah. Um, you know, John, John Adams admonition to us a long time ago of, we intended a country not of men, but of laws. Right. And, you know, it's wonderful when we can, when, when we can marry a coincidence, um, an effective marriage between the law and the actions of, of men.

[: 00:57:33

[00:57:49] Ken Weinstein: Yeah, look, I, I, I think, I think the, look, I think the answer for the president would lie.

[: 00:57:54

[00:58:09] Dr. Ike Wilson: I would even say, you know, I would even say Centris, you know, democratic

[: 00:58:12

[00:58:13] Absolutely. I, I agree on that point. Yeah. Then the question becomes on, you know, on the constitutionality of some of these actions, I think it has to go to the Supreme Court. I can't, I am not a constitutional scholar. It is obviously, uh, you know, I think it, and where the, you know, where the War powers act needs to be invoked or not.

[: 00:58:34

[00:58:46] use.

[: 00:58:47

[00:58:54] The situation prevails. Well, it is not a, is not an action of war in quite the same way. It is. I view it [00:59:00] more as a police action in my mind that doesn't, but I, I could be understating the, its its magnitude. I don't view it, it's not as, you know, I don't, I don't view it as, you know, some massive deployment of US troops.

[: 00:59:14

[00:59:19] Dr. Ike Wilson: No, it's, I mean that's, I'm, I'm, that's kind of where I land as well. I mean, you called it what I think it is as well. More of a, a major policing action. But we have, we have policing rules.

[: 00:59:29

[00:59:29] Dr. Ike Wilson: Um, not, not lethal strike. Um.

[: 00:59:33

[00:59:51] Yeah. And, and to adjudicate that. And then the point on the courts, absolutely no, no doubt that, um, this has, the law [01:00:00] has a restraining factor in enabling, but a restraining factor on use of force. It's that madisonian, you know, check on power, fail safe, regardless of whether it's a blue administration or, or a, a red administration.

[: 01:00:13

[01:00:33] We're, we're kind of lost in that trade space. And, uh, there lies our sense of self identity of what kind of nation we are.

[: 01:00:41

[01:00:41] Dr. Ike Wilson: Is, is this about killing for cause or is this about a just war type of justification for the actions we're taking and everything that lies in between? And we're not gonna get to any answers on this one, but I, at least for our, our listeners, our fellow travelers, I wanted to at least articulate, I'm glad we found one spot, Ken, in our, in [01:01:00] our, uh, flyover global fiber.

[: 01:01:01

[01:01:23] And then the realities of the business, lack of legal adjudications, right? The, the court, this will eventually reach our courts, our Supreme Court. They will adjudicate on it in terms of its justice and legality. But we know that it's just like in economics. There'll be a business lag to that, and it'll come after the fact of our doing.

[: 01:01:39

[01:02:05] So that people at least can feel a little bit more comfortable in the ambiguity.

[: 01:02:09

[01:02:15] Dr. Ike Wilson: Exactly. Exactly. Real quick, lightning round. I wanna, I want to ask you pointed things. Uh, this may be a, it's gonna be a fun question, but may not be completely, completely fair.

[: 01:02:25

[01:02:46] What, what's a in a measurable indicator there?

[: 01:02:49

[01:03:01] Dr. Ike Wilson: Europeans. Yes.

[: 01:03:01

[01:03:09] I think it's a recognition that Ukraine could actually win this thing or that this, that we're with the Ukrainians for the long run. And that that's clear. Period.

[: 01:03:19

[01:03:30] Ken Weinstein: Yeah.

[: 01:03:31

[01:03:54] Um. Commanding height in terms of def defense, industrial production [01:04:00] capacity. So very excited

[: 01:04:01

[01:04:04] Dr. Ike Wilson: Uh, how about Israel Gaza one, one concrete indicator to give us hope going forward? A 20 point plan.

[: 01:04:13

[01:04:23] One that is closer to geo geographically to Israel, that is gonna be free of Hamas. Yeah. Uh, in terms of the government. And the question becomes just how big is that second, uh, enclave and just how big is Hamas' role there? If Hamas can be really defeated as a fighting force, I think it bodes much better for the future of, uh, of Gaza, the future of, uh, uh, of the Palestinian authority as well.

[: 01:04:49

[01:05:19] Those are, I guess, the two. So I gave you two answers, sorry.

[: 01:05:21

[01:05:42] Yeah, I think there were three to 5,000 fighters left was some type of Exodus plan and a safe haven exile for.

[: 01:05:49

[01:05:56] Dr. Ike Wilson: Do you see, see any, do you see any similar, not, you know, most similar case [01:06:00] play here in this, in this scenario?

[: 01:06:02

[01:06:03] Ken Weinstein: the lesson learned from, uh, that experience is do not let these people do not take Kamas people, let them go somewhere and then bring them back. Yeah. I think Israel is applying, uh, the Munich rule, which is anybody involved in the 72 Munich massacre. I think you're right, uh, would pay the price.

[: 01:06:19

[01:06:28] Dr. Ike Wilson: How about the real tough one, uh, Taiwan, south China Sea?

[: 01:06:31

[01:06:50] Her Chief Cabinet's Secretary, Meor Kihara and his first press conference talked about the need to deepen Taiwanese Japanese, uh, relations. Mm-hmm. They do not have [01:07:00] official relations between the two countries, but, uh, to the extent that the Taiwanese and the Japanese are willing to work on security issues together, and they a, you know, highly sensitive and classified manner, the better it is for, uh, the United States, the better it is for the future of Taiwan.

[: 01:07:16

[01:07:40] A focus for his administration has failed to bring out the support he, uh, the Taiwanese people should have for re-arming. So all these things, it is gonna be a challenging quarter, but I think, uh, if Takai, um, is as effective as I think she is, I think it Bos well for, uh, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.

[: 01:07:58

[01:08:03] Ken Weinstein: Boy, I mean, the big question in the next quarter, does Muro survive? If, if he is gone, you know, in the aftermath of, uh, Malays massive elective victory, I think we're gonna start to see a bit of a turn in Latin America away from the kind of, uh, uh, populism that, uh, the kind of anti-American populism, anti-Western populism, which is often funded in fact by the Chinese seeking to get, uh, rare earth and other materials out of, uh, Latin America.

[: 01:08:34

[01:08:42] Dr. Ike Wilson: Ken, I want to leave you with, uh, the last word. Um, as we look across all the regions, what's your single most important takeaway? Not, it doesn't have to be about weapons or wealth, but more about how nations keep legitimacy and restraint in a world that's, you know, put it, put it kindly, constantly bending.

[: 01:08:58

[01:08:58] Ken Weinstein: No, I think the most [01:09:00] important thing is the need for the us uh, us presence on the global stage. We don't need to have the role we did, you know, in the Cold War or even during, uh, you know, the Bush two administration. But we need to be present. We need to be heard, we need to be visible. We need to be engaging, uh, with global leaders, uh, to bring them in, have them voice their concerns.

[: 01:09:24

[01:09:48] I was like, what? What happened? Yeah. And I don't, and that's, that is not gonna happen if the US is engaged in the region that the Chinese cannot invade Taiwan. Uh, you know, they could have, uh, some sort of a, [01:10:00] uh, you know, internal action where they pull a coup.

[: 01:10:04

[01:10:04] Ken Weinstein: But external invasion is increasingly less likely.

[: 01:10:07

[01:10:32] Dr. Ike Wilson: Well, Ken, Dr. Weinstein, I knew this was gonna be a phenomenal global walkabout and talk about, um, I also knew we were gonna deviate from original set plan right off the get go, and I'm so glad we did. Thanks so much. Uh, always great to have an opportunity to learn with you and from you, Ken. Uh, thanks so much for joining us on the Civic Brief.

[: 01:10:51

[01:11:00] Dr. Ike Wilson: we go take, we can go take a breather for a bit.

[: 01:11:02

[01:11:05] Dr. Ike Wilson: care. Good. See you. Good

[: 01:11:06

[01:11:13] Narrator: Thanks for tuning into the Civic Brief, uh, questions, insights, or ideas. Join us@thecivicbrief.com to continue the dialogue, subscribe, share, and be part of shaping the future One brief at a time.